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cENT CASES
To guard against "coerced confessions," the magistrate should also be
present at all times when the suspect is being interrogated. This system
would elevate magistrates to the status of more useful public officials,
would relieve attorneys of the overwhelming burden which may other-
wise be cast upon them, would reduce or eliminate appeals on the
basis of "right to counsel" and "coerced confession," and would insure
the rights of the suspect prior to arraignment. 21
Paul W. Blair
EvmENCE-INTERNAL REVENUE CODE-ADMISSIBILTY OF ILLEGALLY-OB-
TAmiND EVIDENCE.-An information under section 7203 of title 26 United
States Code' was filed against defendants charging each with failure to
file income tax returns for two taxable years. Subsequently an indict-
ment under section 7201 of title 26 United States Code2 was returned
against defendants charging each with willful tax evasion. Before the
trial defendants moved to suppress for use as evidence against them
certain files, records and information seized by means of a compulsory
process directed at one Birrell. The court reserved decision on all
issues raised by the motion and the case proceeded to trial. The jury
failed to reach a verdict and the judge declined to decide the reserved
motion.
In another court, Birrell moved to have the seized documents sup-
pressed as evidence against him and returned to him, and to have
various indictments against him dismissed. Neither the indictment
nor the information that charged defendants, charged Birrell, and
therefore, neither was made the subject of Birrell's motion. A decision
on Birrell's motion was reserved by the court.
Upon assignment of the information and indictment against de-
fendants to the United States district court for the southern district of
New York, defendants renewed their motion to suppress, and, in
21 See, supra note 2.
1 Any person required under this title to pay any estimated tax or tax, or
required by this title or by regulations made under authority thereof to make a
return. .. keep any records, or supply any information, who willfully fails to pa
such estimated tax or tax, make such return, keep such records, or supply suc
information, at the time or times required by law or regulations, shall, in addition
to other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon con-
viction thereof, shall be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more
than 1 year, or both, together with the costs of prosecution.
2 Any person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any
tax imposed by this title or the payment thereof, shall, in addition to other
penalties by law, be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined
not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both, together
with costs of prosecution.
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addition, requested that the trial be postponed pending the decision
on the Birrell motions. The court denied the renewed motion and the
request, determining that under the test of Jones v. United States,3
defendants lacked standing to challenge the lawfulness of the seizure.
Defendants vainly renewed their motions throughout the trial and
post trial motions. Verdicts of guilty were returned against de-
fendants on the information charge of failure to file tax returns. The
jury failed to agree with respect to the indictment count of willful tax
evasion.
After defendants' trial, Birrell was granted his motion to suppress.
On the strength of that determination, defendants promptly renewed
their motions to suppress, attacking both their indictment and con-
viction. Held: Motions denied. The fact that evidence had been
illegally obtained from Birrell, who was not a defendant, did not
preclude admission of the evidence against the other defendants.
United States v. Granello, 248 F. Supp. 325 (S.D. N.Y. 1965).
In reaching this result the court interpreted the Supreme Court
case of Wong Sun v. United States4 as an expression of the rule that
the fact that evidence has been obtained from A in violation of A's
constitutional rights5 does not prevent its admission in a prosecution
of B. In Wong Sun the government had obtained possession of nar-
cotics from one Yee as a result of information obtained from de-
fendant Toy in violation of Toy's rights. The narcotics were admitted
into evidence against both Toy and defendant, Wong Sun. The
Supreme Court reversed Toy's conviction because of the admission of
evidence seized in violation of Toy's rights. As to defendant Wong
Sun, the Court held that, though his conviction had to be reversed
on other grounds, the narcotics were properly admitted against him.
The rule brought forth from Wong Sun by the court which decided
Granello conveys the basic idea that in order to be heard to claim a
constitutional protection, the claimant must belong to the class for
whose sake the protection is given.6 Fundamentally the fourth amend-
ment exclusion rule is a means for making effective protection of
8 362 U.S. 257 (1960). In order to qualify as a 'person aggrieved by an un-
lawful search and seizure' one must have been a victim of a search or seizure, one
against whom the search was directed, as distinguished from one who claims gre-judice only through the use of evidence gathered as a consequence of a searc or
seizure directed at someone else. 362 U.S. at 261.
4371 U.S. 471 (1963).
5 The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to
be seized. U.S. Const. amend. IV.6 Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U.S. 152 (1907).
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privacy and the security of property, i.e., a personal protection. There-
fore, to avail of that protection, one must establish the evasion of his
own right to property7 or privacy.8 He must be the one against whom
the search was directed or a victim of the seizure, and not merely a
person claiming prejudice through the use of evidence gathered as a
consequence of a search and seizure directed at another.9 As the
Court stated in Wong Sun:
The exclusion of the narcotics as to Toy was required solely by their
tainted relationship to information unlawfully obtained from Toy, and
not by any official impropriety connected with their surrender by Yee.
The seizure of the heroin invaded no right of privacy of person or
premises which would entitle Wong Sun to object to its use at his
trial.10
The rule brought forth in Granello is well grounded in the Wong
Sun decision and lends support to the conclusion that the fourth
amendment exclusion rule is to be narrowly construed by the federal
courts, i.e., evidence seized from A in violation of A's rights will always
be admissible against B.
In adopting this strict limitation upon the fourth amendment
protection the court in Granello considered two basic alternatives as
suggested in the opinions of the courts:
(1) The government cannot use against anyone evidence that
has been illegally seized;
(2) Evidence seized in violation of A's rights can be used
against B if it is physically available, or if it is contra-
band, or where for some other reason A is not entitled to
its return.
To examine these alternatives we will analyze the cases cited by the
court in illustration of each proposition.
The Government Cannot use Against Anyone Evidence that has
Been Illegally Seized.
In McDonald v. United States" defendants McDonald and Wash-
ington were tried jointly for operating an illegal lottery. Unlawfully
seized evidence was admitted against both defendants. The illegal
seizure had taken place in McDonald's room where Washington was
merely a guest. The Supreme Court held that the seizure violated
McDonald's rights under the fourth amendment and reversed his con-
7 United States v. Lee Van Nam, 274 F.2d 863 (1960).8 Tones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
o !bid.
103 71 U.S. at 492.
11335 U.S. 451 (1948).
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viction. In reversing the conviction of defendant Washington, the
Court said:
Even though we assume, without deciding, that Washington, who was
a guest of McDonald, had no right of privacy that was broken when
the officers searched McDonald's room without a warrant, we think
that the denial of McDonald's motion was error prejudicial to Washing-
ton as well.' 2
The Court declined to specifically decide whether or not Washing-
ton's personal rights were violated by the search of McDonald's room.
However, Mr. Justice Rutledge, in his concurring opinion, indicated
that such a determination would be of no consequence. He concurred
with the Court's opinion as to the inadmissibility of the evidence with
respect to McDonald, but as to Washington he concurred on the
ground "that the evidence, having been illegally obtained, was inadmis-
sible,"13 the idea ostensibly being that evidence illegally obtained is
inadmissible as against any defendant.
As noted by the court in Granello, the view of Mr. Justice Rutledge
was expressed by no other Justice. Rejection of this proposition,
however, was based on more than mere lack of authority to support it.
The court concluded that the only acceptable basis for such a rule
would be to determine that the policy against illegal searches and
seizures by the government is so strong that the law ought to deter
such practice by preventing it from being of any benefit whatever.
A corollary to this policy would be the idea that one of the primary
reasons for raising the fourth amendment exclusionary rule is to deter
official illegality. 4 But the court concluded that such a strict inhibi-
tion on governmental authorities only serves to distribute incidental
benefits to wrongdoers far more than it safeguards the highly cherished
right of privacy.
Consideration of this proposition thus involves the weighing against
each other of two important public policies: that of proper con-
stitutional safeguards under the fourth amendment and the policy of
public protection. It is submitted that the court in Granello correctly
determined that to adopt such a strict adherence to the fourth amend-
ment exclusionary rule as to render a result that official illegality always
works inadmissibility would deter adequate law enforcement more
than it would safeguard the rights of privacy or property. To insist
upon the policy that "the criminal is to go free because the constable
12 Id. at 456.
13 Id. at 457.
14 Compare Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), with Mapp v. Ohio, 867
U.S. 643 (1961).
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has blundered"15 is not only to impose an unwise and inefficient
sanction on law enforcement but also to greatly extend the intent of
the protection afforded through the fourth amendment.
Evidence Seized in Violation of As Rights can be Used Against B
if it is Physically Available, or if it is Contraband, or Where for
Some Other Reason A is not Entitled to its Return.
The proposition that evidence seized in violation of A's rights can
be used against B if it is physically available is attributable to the view
of the four other concurring Justices in McDonald,16 including Mr.
Justice Douglas, writer of the main opinion. The proposition suggests
that admissibility as to B depends upon the availability of the evidence
to a court after a determination of the illegality of the seizure. The
basic premise is that if the search and seizure as to A is found to be
illegal, such illegally obtained evidence must be returned to A and is
therefore not available against B. It would then follow that if the
evidence was obtained without violation of A's rights, it would
not have to be returned and would be available and admissible
against both A and B. In McDonald, if the illegally seized evidence
had been returned to defendant McDonald, it would not have been
available for use against defendant Washington, therefore denial of
McDonald's motion was prejudicial to Washington as well,
Rejecting this proposition, the court in Granello noted its impracti-
cality. In McDonald, even if the seized evidence had been returned
to McDonald, it would have been available to the government by
means of compulsory legal process. Practically speaking, no property
is unavailable to the government except property that has been
destroyed, and destruction can be prevented by the service of com-
pulsory process on the aggrieved party at the same time that the
illegally seized property is returned to him.
A corollary to the availibility proposition is the answer suggested in
United States v. Lee Wan Nam.17 There, defendant Lee Wan Nam
had been convicted of having violated the Narcotic Drugs Import and
Export Act. On appeal, defendant contended that evidence once
suppressed and held inadmissible during a trial cannot be subse-
quently introduced in the same trial even though the victim of the
illegal search and seizure had been dismissed as a defendant. Denying
this contention and affirming the conviction, the court held that here
the property illegally seized was heroin, and as such it was contra-
15 People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926).
16 335 U.S. 451 (1948).
17 274 F.2d 863 (1960).
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band. It could not be returned to the aggrieved party despite the
illegal seizure. On this basis, the court made a distinction as to
McDonald where the decision as to the defendant's conviction turned
upon the fact that there was error in not returning the evidence to the
aggrieved party. The court considered its decision to be in com-
plete agreement with the McDonald decision.18
To adopt the proposition that evidence seized in violation of A's
rights is admissible against B where contraband is involved would be
to create an inconsistency in the law and a clear discrimination
favoring certain defendants over others. Where the unlawfully seized
evidence consisted of property other than contraband, such as lottery
tickets as in McDonald, B would be protected as an incidental bene-
ficiary to A's rights under the fourth amendment. B would not be so
protected where, as in Lee Wan Nam, the seized property consisted
of narcotics or other such contraband.
The analysis of these alternative propositions leads to the conclu-
sion that to broaden the exclusionary rule, as defendants sought in
Granello, and to include as incidental beneficiaries of the deterrence
policy persons whose rights were unaffected by the official legality
would be to render the rule a far more inefficient sanction. As the
court points out, whether or not the rule is to be so broadened is a
matter ultimately for the Supreme Court, and in light of present
policies and authorities it is difficult to anticipate it doing so.
David W. Crumbo
CRUMINAL LAw-SARcH Am SEZtURE-RETROACTIVnT OF Mapp.-Peti-
tioner was convicted of robbery by a Louisiana court on May 20, 1959.
At his trial he contested the use of certain evidence on the ground
that it had been illegally seized, but the trial court held the seizure
valid. The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed. In June 1961, immedi-
ately after the Mapp decision1 making the federal exclusionary rule
mandatory upon state courts, petitioner filed an application for habeas
corpus in the state court. The writ was denied and on appeal the denial
was affirmed. Petitioner then filed habeas corpus proceedings in the
federal district court; again the writ was denied and petitioner ap-
pealed to the circuit court of appeals. There, the court ruled the
search and seizure invalid, but refused to apply the Mapp rule to
petitioner's case. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. Held: Al-
18 Id. at 866.
1Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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